Fordham Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 6

Article 1

November 2011

Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House
Administration
Heidi Kitrosser

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House Administration , 79 Fordham L.
Rev. 2395 (2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss6/1

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SYMPOSIUM
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE OVER
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF WHITE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
Heidi Kitrosser*
In March 2009, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum
instructing the Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop recommendations within 120 days
“for Presidential action designed to guarantee scientific integrity throughout
the executive branch.” 1 The President contrasted his approach with that of
the previous administration. Speaking to the National Academy of Sciences
in April 2009, he lamented that “we have watched as scientific integrity has
been undermined and scientific research politicized in an effort to advance
predetermined ideological agendas.”2 His charge to OSTP, he said, is
meant “to ensure that federal policies are based on the best and most
unbiased scientific information . . . [and] that facts are driving scientific
Yet the OSTP
decisions—and not the other way around.” 3
recommendations, which were due in July 2009, were not issued until
December 2010.
They amounted to a four-page document that
commentators deemed vague and insufficiently directive to agencies. 4 The
Obama Administration was also sued under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) for failing to disclose documents pertaining to the reasons for
delay. 5 The Obama White House also claims, like its predecessors, a
* Associate Professor and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota
Law School. I would like to thank Aaron Saiger for putting together, and inviting me to
participate in, a terrific symposium.
1. Memorandum on Scientific Integrity from the Administration of Barack H. Obama
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900137/pdf/DCPD-200900137.pdf
[hereinafter
Scientific Integrity Memo].
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences (Apr. 27,
2009).
3. Id.; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing an Executive Order
Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells and a
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD200900294/pdf/DCPD-200900294.pdf.
4. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.

2395

2396

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

constitutional right to review agency scientific testimony and reports before
they are publicly disseminated. 6 And scientists and open government
advocates accuse the administration of failing to protect government
employees who report problems in science-related agencies or programs. 7
Citing the apparent discrepancies between the rhetoric and reality of
scientific integrity in the Obama Administration, Jeff Ruch, the Executive
Director of the group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
(PEER), observed:
“One of the central tensions in the Obama
Administration is a rhetorical commitment to transparency and a fanatical
devotion to message control. And the two don’t go together.”8 To varying
degrees, this tension can be found in all modern presidencies. Like the
character on The Simpsons who routinely surfaces in political debates to
implore, “Think of the children!,” 9 modern Presidents understand both the
ease and the political benefit of applauding transparency as an abstract
proposition. At the same time, they know that the public will hold them
and their party responsible, for better or worse, for major national
developments. And in this age of the “rhetorical presidency,” 10 Presidents
are expected not only to resolve, but to say all the right things about
national problems. It thus is not surprising that modern Presidents
champion transparency in the abstract while trying to shape public
perceptions about national events by cloaking and manipulating
information.
Conflicts over executive information control cut across substantive
policy realms. Such disputes can arise in scenarios ranging from a White
House claim of executive privilege for its social secretary, 11 to Justice
Department motions to dismiss lawsuits against government contractors on
the basis that litigation could reveal state secrets,12 to presidential claims of
a constitutional right to preclude agency officials from delivering
information to Congress or the public before clearing it with the White
House. 13
This Article focuses on the Obama Administration’s relationship to
scientific information in the administration’s first half (through early
January 2011, when this Article was completed). Activities that mix
politics and science—such as where a policy decision is justified partly by
scientific conclusions or where scientists assess and report on the efficacy
6. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
8. Dan Froomkin, Despite Obama’s Lofty Words, Scientific Integrity Rules Are
Lagging,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
9,
2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/09/despite-obamas-lofty-word_n_641082.html
(quoting Jeff Ruch).
9. See Helen Lovejoy, SIMPSONS WIKI, http://simpsons.wikia.com/wiki/Helen_Lovejoy
(identifying the character Helen Lovejoy as the regular speaker of this catchphrase).
10. See generally JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
11. See Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2009, at C7.
12. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77,
97–99, 150–55 (2010).
13. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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of government actions already taken—offer both opportunity and
temptation for policymakers to shape scientific “facts” to support their
desired outcomes. Such information control may entail keeping certain
facts secret. It may also involve attempts to manipulate information that
does get released. 14 I use the term “information control” throughout this
Article to denote both government secrecy and government efforts to
manipulate information that the public sees or that select groups (for
example, congressional committees) receive. I use the term “information
integrity” as shorthand for the opposite of information control—that is, for
a relatively transparent system that seeks to present factual information as
truthfully as possible. Scientific integrity is a subset of information
integrity. Processes embodying scientific integrity are designed to enable
expert scientific findings to be presented without extra-scientific
interference or distortion.
The first half of the Obama Administration casts the tension between
abstract support for information integrity and the desire to control
information in particularly sharp relief. Campaigning toward the end of the
Bush Administration, which was frequently called “the most secretive
administration in our history,” 15 candidate Obama vowed to “run the most
transparent administration in American history.”16 This promise remained
a major theme of President Obama’s earliest days in office. On his first full
day as President, he issued an executive order broadening public access to
presidential records, 17 a memorandum directing his Attorney General to
oversee broader compliance with FOIA, 18 and a memorandum “direct[ing]
agencies to harness new technologies to make information available to the
public and . . . top officials to draft a blueprint Open Government
Directive.” 19 On March 9, 2009, he issued his scientific integrity directive.
These early actions and rhetoric appeared to reflect a sense that, at least for
a moment in time, transparency and information integrity had some real
political resonance—at minimum, that they excited and mobilized segments
of the Democratic base.

14. For a detailed and insightful study of the many techniques through which scientific
information can be distorted by the government and by private actors alike, see generally
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS
CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008).
15. Ted Widmer, Making War, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 9, 2004, at 7 (reviewing
BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004)); see also, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN
WATERGATE: THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH xi (2004); William G. Weaver
& Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 108 (2005);
Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Psst. President Bush Is Hard at Work Expanding Government
Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A24.
16. Justin Rood & Megan Chuchmach, Money, Secrets Top DC Watchdog Worries in
’09 (Jan. 2, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6519441 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Obama at 100 Days – 21st Century Right-to-Know Agenda,
OMB WATCH (Apr. 2009), at 2–3, http://www.ombwatch.org/files/obamaat100daysrtk.pdf.
17. Obama at 100 days, supra note 16, at 7.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3.
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Analyzing a subset of these events in the Obama Administration’s first
half—specifically, those involving scientific integrity—sheds light on the
politics of information integrity, including factors that create windows of
opportunity for concrete action and change. Such analysis also illuminates
the potential of White House administrative directives to enhance
information integrity and government accountability. Scientific integrity in
the Obama Administration also provides a study in the other side of the
tension between information integrity and information control—that is, the
gravitational pull of the latter.
As suggested above, the Obama
Administration has yet to live up to the promise of its March 9, 2009
directive and related statements.
Considering how and why the
administration has fallen short in this respect sheds light on a number of
matters, including the pitfalls of White House administration, the use of
constitutional theories of preclusive presidential powers to justify White
House information control, and the tenuousness of transparency’s political
resonance.
Part I situates this Article within the broader history and literature of
White House control of the administrative state and the impact of such
control on accountability and transparency. Part II discusses ways in which
the Obama Administration has fallen short, thus far, in protecting scientific
integrity. Part III assesses some positive developments in the Obama
Administration with respect to scientific integrity. Part IV considers
lessons that might be drawn about the relationship between presidential
administration and scientific integrity from the Obama Administration’s
first two years. It concludes that while presidential administration alone is
insufficient and often counter-productive for fostering information integrity,
statutory schemes can harness the positive potential of presidential
administration while imposing checks necessary to curtail its dangers. Part
IV also considers related constitutional and political lessons.
I. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY: SOME
BACKGROUND
A. Developing the Modern Infrastructure of Presidential Administration
Forrest McDonald has observed that, “[f]rom the point of view of
administration, the history of the presidency in the twentieth century has
been the history of presidents’ attempts to gain control of the sprawling
federal bureaucracy.” 20 Early twentieth century Presidents sought to wrest
control of the administrative state from Congress, which had come to
dominate administration by the latter half of the nineteenth century. A
major focus of these presidential efforts was the budget. 21 Prior to the
passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 22 there was no such
20. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 329
(1994).
21. Id. at 329–31; see also PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY:
COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING 1905–1996, at 11, 19–21, 27–51 (2d ed. 1998).
22. Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
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thing as a centralized federal budget. Rather, a hodgepodge of statutory
directives and informal practices dictated the terms through which the
Treasury Department and individual agencies reported budgetary
information to Congress, which in turn legislated expenditures through
similarly disjointed processes. As President William Taft’s Commission on
Economy and Efficiency reported to Congress, no one in the administration,
in Congress, or among the public or press could speak to the overall
condition of the United States budget or to how different pieces of it
complemented, duplicated, were inconsistent with, or otherwise related to
one another. 23
In 1912, President Taft presented the Commission’s findings to
Congress, along with the Commission’s recommendations for a centralized
federal budgetary process in which the President would play a prominent
role. 24 Under the proposed system, bureaucrats would report budgetary
information and requests up the chain of command in the executive branch,
ultimately reaching individual agency heads, the Treasury Secretary, and
the President. Drawing from these reports, the Treasury Secretary would,
under the President’s oversight and direction, draw up a clear and detailed
budget for congressional consideration. The Commission also urged the
creation of a high-level office to assist the President in this process.25
While Congress initially rejected these proposals as presidential
overreaching, it largely adopted them several years later in response to
wartime deficits. “The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provided that
the President, assisted by a new Bureau of the Budget (placed in the
Treasury Department but understood to have a direct connection to the
President), would oversee and coordinate all agencies’ budget requests.” 26
The next major victory for White House administration occurred during
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Presidency. With the New Deal having
expanded an already broad administrative state, FDR sought to redirect
concerns over a “headless ‘fourth branch’” toward support for greater
consolidation of federal agencies under presidential control.27 The
Brownlow Commission, which FDR spearheaded, issued a report
championing enhanced White House control and responsibility over the
administrative state.28 The report proposed, among other things, “six new
assistants to be assigned at presidential discretion. It also recommended
23. The Need for a National Budget, 62d Cong. 1–8, 140 (1912) [hereinafter TAFT
COMMISSION REPORT] (Message from President William Howard Taft transmitting the
Report of Commission on Economy & Efficiency on the subject of the need for a national
budget); ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 26–51.
24. TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1–8.
25. Id. at 7–8, 141–48, 204–06, 217–23.
26. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275 (2001);
see also ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 53–54; THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 15–16 (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT].
27. MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–33; see also BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 26, at 2, 43, 47.
28. See BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 1–3; ARNOLD, supra note
21, at 103–07, 116–17; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–34.
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discretionary funds that would enable the president to acquire more help
when needed.” The report also “proposed a major organizational addition
to the presidency, the Executive Office, with the Bureau of the Budget as its
centerpiece.” 29 The Brownlow Commission and FDR sought new
legislation to implement these proposals. Their efforts, however, became
caught in a political firestorm over fears of a dictatorial presidency. Such
fears were compounded by FDR’s simultaneous push to pack the Supreme
Court. 30 Nonetheless, Congress partly relented in 1939, passing a
Reorganization Act that gave the President some of the new authority that
he sought. 31 The Act gave Roosevelt reorganization powers and authority
to hire new staff. Roosevelt used the new authority to “create[] the
Executive Office of the President” (EOP). He moved the Bureau of the
Budget, along with other central planning offices, into the EOP. He
followed these changes with an executive order “designat[ing] the formal
relationships in the Executive Office, the White House Office with its new
assistants, the Bureau of the Budget, and the remaining components of the
new presidential establishment.” 32
With the beginnings of a White House administrative infrastructure in
place, and with the public increasingly accepting—even demanding—of
presidential control over federal programs, the seeds of the modern
administrative presidency were planted.33 The modern era, generally traced
back to the Richard M. Nixon Administration, has been characterized by a
large expansion of the EOP and increasingly aggressive efforts by
Presidents to shape, curtail, or spur specific agency actions.34 Symbolizing
the modern approach, the Bureau of the Budget was renamed the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) during the Nixon Administration. The
name change signaled the agency’s new role as a clearinghouse not only for
budgetary decisions but for broader policy matters. Under President Nixon,
the OMB was tasked with reviewing certain proposed agency rulemakings. 35 The practice was continued and built upon under Presidents
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Executive Orders issued by Presidents
Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush substantially expanded
the OMB’s review powers over agency rulemakings. 36
29. ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 104 (citing BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
26, at 6–7).
30. ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 107–09; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 333.
31. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 565 (1939).
32. ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 114.
33. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 85–87; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–34;
Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275.
34. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–82; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 701–02, 719–
20 (2007).
35. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 338–39; Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–76.
36. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (2003); Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–82;
Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061–63 (1986); Strauss, supra note 34, at 701–02,
719–20.
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B. Some Early Discussions of Presidential Administration, Accountability,
and Transparency
As far back as the founding, concerns over transparency and
accountability have been raised by all sides in debates over presidential
control of administration.37 For example, proponents of ratifying the
Constitution boasted of its provision for a single President with no
constitutionally annexed advisory council. Any wrongful actions by the
President, they predicted, would be readily tracked and punished, as he
would have no council behind which to hide. 38 Anti-federalists lamented,
on the other hand, that a council-less President would choose other, less
visible “‘minions and favourites’” to direct him, making it more difficult to
track his or their actions. 39 Anti-federalists also warned that the councilless President would himself suffer for want of “‘proper information and
advice.’” 40
Moving ahead to the 20th century, issues of transparency and
accountability were central foci in two seminal works justifying presidential
administration—the Taft and Brownlow Commission Reports. 41 While
both commissions were strongly presidentialist in orientation, their reports
evince some appreciation for the complex relationship between presidential
administration, transparency, and accountability. At minimum, each
reflects an understanding of the political value in invoking transparency and
checks and balances. Each report portrays the relationship between
presidential administration and accountability as a positive one, explaining
that the more control that the President wields over the administrative state,
the more that Congress and the people will know who to blame or to credit
for administrative actions. Yet neither report assumes that presidential
control alone is sufficient to create real accountability. Rather, each
champions internal and external checking mechanisms to support and
supplement presidential control. Both reports deem such mechanisms
necessary to ensure a flow of accurate information to, within, and from the
executive branch. Without this information flow, neither the President, nor
Congress, nor the people could make well supported judgments or hold
each other meaningfully to account.
The Taft Commission Report championed a presidentially prepared
federal budget as a means to enhance accountability. President Taft echoed
the Report’s reasoning in his message transmitting it to Congress. He
explained:
37. See, Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 607, 623–29, 632–34 (2009).
38. Id. at 623–26.
39. Id. at 624–26 (quoting 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 44 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990)).
40. Id. at 625 (quoting 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 44).
41. For references to the reports’ seminal natures, see, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 21, at
49–51 (describing significance of TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23); id. at 115–17
(describing significance of BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26); MCDONALD,
supra note 20, at 331–34 (citing historical roles of both reports).
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there is at present no provision for reporting revenues, expenditures, and
estimates for appropriations in such manner that the Executive, before
submitting estimates, and each Member of Congress, and the people, after
estimates have been submitted, may know what has been done by the
Government or what the Government proposes to do. 42

While the Taft Commission Report prescribed greater presidential
control over appointments and administrative communications with
Congress, 43 it also stressed the need to harness bureaucratic expertise to
provide an accurate factual picture against which the President, Congress,
and the public could make and judge decisions.44 What is more, the Report
emphasized that the budgetary decision-making chain—from bureaucratic
analyses and recommendations to Presidential budget formation to
legislative votes—should be transparent. 45 The Commission explained that
“[o]ne of the most important features of [its] recommendation is that which
requires that every plan to be executed be made an open book, to be read by
the Congress, by officers of the administration, and by the public.”46
The Brownlow Commission Report echoed and expanded on these
themes. The Commission famously observed that “[t]he President needs
help.” 47 It envisioned some of this help taking the form of measures to
“facilitate the flow upward to the President of information upon which he is
to base his decisions and the flow downward from the President of the
decisions once taken for execution by the department or departments
affected.” 48
The Commission also deemed the flow of information outside of the
executive branch crucial. It urged:
Nothing should be done that would diminish the importance of the work
of the congressional committees in conducting hearings and pursuing
investigations. Time and time again in our history investigations
conducted by congressional committees have illumined [sic] dark places
in the Government and in the affairs of the Nation and have resulted in the
correction of abuses that otherwise might have been undetected for years
and years. It is with full realization of the necessity of continuing and
preserving this important function of the Congress and its committees that
we suggest the necessity for improving the machinery of holding the
Executive Branch more effectively accountable to the Congress.49

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1 (message from President Taft).
Id. at 19–22, 143–44, 147–48, 203–05.
Id. at 139–42, 219–20.
Id. at 214–23.
Id. at 221.
BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 43.
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Indeed, while the Commission supported the executive branch practice of
centrally clearing agencies’ legislative proposals, 50 it made plain its view
that Congress must have access to truthful information from throughout the
executive branch. 51
The Brownlow Commission Report also criticized the structure of the
Comptroller General’s office because the office performed both accounting
and auditing functions but was not clearly accountable to either the
President or Congress. While the Commission deemed accounting an
executive function that demands accountability to the President, it was
equally emphatic in its view that auditors must be free from executive
political controls to ensure the integrity of their work. 52 The current
system, said the Commission:
deprives the President of essential power needed to discharge his major
executive responsibility. Equally important, it deprives the Congress of a
really independent audit and review of the fiscal affairs of the
Government by an official who has no voice in administrative
determinations, which audit is necessary to hold the Administration
accountable. 53

Relatedly, the Brownlow Commission stressed the importance of neutral
competence throughout the executive branch. It argued, for example, that
“[t]he merit system should be extended upward, outward, and downward to
include all positions in the Executive Branch of the Government except
those which are policy-determining in character.” 54
C. Presidential Administration, Accountability, and Transparency:
Modern Problems and Debates
In recent years, the most prolific proponents of presidential
administration have been unitary executive theorists, or “unitarians.”55
Unitarians argue that, as a matter of constitutional law, the President must
control all discretionary executive activity in the United States.56 Under the
theory’s strongest version, the President must be able not only to fire
executive personnel at will but to directly supplant their decisions (with or
without firing them) with his own decisions.57 From this perspective, for
50. Id. at 19–20.
51. Id. at 19, 43–44.
52. Id. at 15, 20–21.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 7.
55. “Presidential administration” does not necessarily require the application of unitary
executive theory.
Indeed, now-Justice Elena Kagan championed “presidential
administration” in an article of the same name without embracing unitarianism. See Kagan,
supra note 26, at 2251, 2320, 2326. She explained that presidential administration often can
be supported through statutory interpretation. Id. at 2326–31.
56. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158, 1166 (1992).
57. Id. at 1166.
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example, the President could “at any time substitute his judgment for that of
the Federal Aviation Administration when the latter acts pursuant to its
statutory charge to promulgate regulations and minimum safety
standards.” 58
Unitarians typically rely in part on arguments from constitutional text,
structure, and history. 59 Elsewhere, I have challenged the textual,
structural, and historical arguments, and others have done so as well.60 For
present purposes, however, a second (though not unrelated) 61 set of
unitarian justifications are most directly relevant. That is, unitarians
routinely argue that presidential control enhances government
accountability. 62 “The gist of the accountability argument is that the
President is the only nationally elected figure in American politics. If he
controls all law execution in the United States, then the national electorate
has a clear object of blame or reward for such activity.” 63 Relative to
unelected bureaucrats or the more parochial interests of congressional
committee members, the President is both uniquely equipped to represent
the wishes of the national electorate64 and uniquely visible. 65
A number of scholars have criticized unitarian claims to accountability.
For one thing, they deem the unitarian vision of accountability unduly
simplistic. Unitarians equate accountability with the placing of thousands
of administrative decisions—ranging from the high profile to the deeply
technical and obscure—in the hands of a single person who is subject to
reelection once. As critics point out, this vision of accountability is
inconsistent with the far more complex accountability envisioned by the
Constitution. The Constitution, say these critics, creates a web of
58. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1746 (2009)
(using this example to illustrate unitary executive theory).
59. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 579–82 (1994); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 56, at
1164–65.
60. Kitrosser, supra note 37, at. 607, 618–34 (2009) (challenging unitarian textual,
structural and historical arguments and citing challenges by other scholars).
61. Indeed, I have discussed at length elsewhere connections between the shortcomings
of “formal” unitarian arguments and those of “functional” unitarian arguments. Id. at 611–
12, 620–21.
62. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35–37, 45, 59, 65–66 (1995); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator, The Framers and the President’s Administrative
Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 998–99, 1012–15 (1993). Additionally, at least two scholars
support unitary executive theory solely on accountability grounds, while disagreeing with
unitarian arguments from text, structure, and history. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 85–86, 94, 98–99 (1994).
And Elena Kagan, while not embracing unitary executive theory, touts the relative
accountability of presidential administration to support her argument for a presumption
favoring presidential administration in statutory interpretation. See Kagan, supra note 26, at
2331–39; see also supra note 55.
63. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1747 (and sources cited therein).
64. Id. at 1747–48 (and sources cited therein).
65. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2337 (making this argument as a policy matter and to
support her statutory interpretation argument, although Kagan does not embrace unitary
executive theory as a constitutional matter); see also supra note 55.
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accountability shared by multiple legislators representing multiple
constituencies and by the President alike. 66 Furthermore, constitutional
accountability mechanisms are not directed solely toward vindicating
majority policy preferences (and certainly not toward doing so through the
instrument of the presidency) but also toward guarding against abuse,
In the context of the
incompetence, and majoritarian tyranny. 67
administrative state, critics argue, constitutional accountability values
demand not only multiple avenues for political accountability, but also
intra-bureaucratic accountability mechanisms characterized by “complex
chains of authority and expertise.” 68
In previous work, I built on these criticisms, explaining that presidential
administration can often defeat accountability by facilitating information
control. Presidential administration can foster information control in
several ways. First, it can deepen the reach of politics into bureaucracy and
hence into scientific research and other forms of fact-finding by subjecting
those who do research to the risk of politically motivated dismissal or
reprisal and by subjecting findings themselves to political interference.69 In
these ways, Presidents and political appointees can manipulate “the very
factual picture against which the public, Congress, and the courts can judge
[executive branch] decisions.” 70 Second, government researchers may be
required to clear any public appearances or reports—such as radio or
television discussions, press releases, or publicly issued studies—with
agency public affairs officers who themselves are politically appointed or
subject to politically motivated dismissals, and who are in place partly to
ensure that any information conveyed is politically “on message.” 71 Third,
government scientists and other agency personnel routinely are required to
clear congressional testimony, including testimony on scientific research, as
well as certain other reports with the OMB. 72 Fourth, the more deeply and
66. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1785
(1996) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1748–49); Peter M. Shane, Political
Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of
Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–209 (1995) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at
1749–50); see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules
for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 992–1007, 1017–20 (1997) (cited in
Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1749 n.36); Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense
Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (Mar. 2005), at 12–15, 35–38, (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1749
n.36).
67. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 552–59, 564–65 (1998) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750); Peter M.
Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613–14 (1989) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750).
68. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750 (citing Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076–83, 2119–22, 2134–35
(2005)).
69. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 607–10, 640, 643–44, 646–47; see also
Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1765–74.
70. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1769.
71. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 640 & n.127; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1773–74.
72. See Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1772; see also Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag,
Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to the Heads of Departments and
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ubiquitously that the OMB’s influence and that of high-level political
appointees reach into the day-to-day work of agencies—including scientific
research—the more difficult it can be for Congress, courts, or the public to
discern the nature of that influence. This blurring of the lines of
responsibility is due partly to the practical availability of executive
privilege claims to high-level political officials. 73 Such blurring also stems
from the fact that multiple political actors—including those from the OMB
and from other high-level political offices—can be involved in any given
effort to influence agency activity. 74 Indeed, it often is unclear whether the
President himself has any knowledge of alleged high-level political
interference in agency activities. Also frequently contested is whether any
presidential ignorance is incidental or is scrupulously maintained to ensure
plausible deniability. 75
II. SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND IN THE
FIRST HALF OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: HOW PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION CAN FOSTER INFORMATION CONTROL
Given the degree and blatancy of its attempts to control scientific
information, the Bush Administration offered some textbook examples of
political interference in science. For instance:
[In] a now infamous period in the middle of the Bush administration. . . .
climate change reports and press releases routinely were edited—
generally by nonscientists, and in one case by a twenty-four-year-old
political appointee who lacked a college degree—to downplay scientists’
conclusions on human-made global warming. Also in this period,
scientists for the first time since NASA’s founding in 1958 were required
to pre-clear media appearances with NASA’s public affairs office. 76

As these and other incidents became publicly known, scientists, open
government advocates, and other commentators expressed great concern
over integrity in government science.77 Promises to restore information
Agencies,
M-09-09
(Jan.
27,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-09.pdf (informing department and
agency heads of the “Executive branch’s formal legislative coordination and clearance
process” detailed in OMB Circular No. A-19; OMB Circular No. A-19 (1979), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a019/) (detailing process by which agencies must
submit testimony and reports to the OMB for “coordination and clearance”).
73. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 609, 654–55; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1763–64,
1766–69.
74. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 638–40, 655; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1765.
75. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 638, 654–56; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1763–69.
76. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1773 (citing MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE: INSIDE
THE POLITICAL ATTACK ON DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING 15–17,
34, 36, 49–50, 56, 67–68, 81, 93–94, 116–17, 119, 123–28, 136, 140–41 (2009)).
77. See, e.g., infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. See generally TIMOTHY
DONAGHY ET AL., ATMOSPHERE OF PRESSURE: POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN FEDERAL
CLIMATE SCIENCE (2007); THE SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY PROGRAM OF THE UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, INTERFERENCE AT THE EPA: SCIENCE AND POLITICS AT THE U.S.
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integrity, including scientific integrity, were significant themes in the
presidential campaign and early presidency of Barack Obama. 78
The backlash against scientific information control in the Bush
Administration is a politically important phenomenon. In Part III, I provide
more detail on manifestations of that backlash in the Obama campaign and
administration, and in Part IV I elaborate on what we may learn from the
backlash and its manifestations. It is equally important, however, to assess
and to learn from respects in which the Obama Administration’s actions
thus far have fallen short of its rhetoric and have even helped to further
entrench information control. The remainder of Part II provides examples
of such shortcomings in the Obama Administration’s first half, and Part IV
draws lessons from the same.
A. Scientific Integrity Directive
As noted in the Introduction, President Obama gave a much ballyhooed
directive to the OSTP in March 2009 to develop recommendations by July
9, 2009 “for Presidential action designed to guarantee scientific integrity
throughout the executive branch.” 79 Yet the recommendations were not
issued until December 17, 2010, more than quintupling the time-frame
outlined by the President. While a long delay of any initiative invites
criticism, several features of this delay and of the December 17
recommendations suggest problems specific to information integrity, and
scientific integrity in particular, in the executive branch.
First, the few vague explanations for the enormous delay that have been
offered as of early January 2011 suggest that much of the hold-up occurred
in the OMB. While OSTP Director John Holdren has provided little
explanation for the delay, he did note in a June 2010 blog post that OSTP
and OMB had received draft recommendations from “an interagency panel
with representatives from all of the major science offices and agencies,” and
that the two offices had “over the intervening months . . . been honing a
final set of recommendations.” 80 Similarly, the bits of information
available as of January 2011 from a heavily redacted set of inter-agency
correspondence disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request suggest that OMB
was a major bottleneck. 81 While virtually nothing has been disclosed as of
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/interference-at-the-epa.pdf.
78. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
79. Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 1; see also Complaint at 1–2, PEER v. OSTP,
(D.D.C.
Oct.
19,
2010)
(No.
110-cv-01762)
available
at
http://peer.org/docs/dc/10_19_10_OSTP_FOIA_Complaint_Final.pdf.
80. John Holdren, Ask Dr. H: “Where Are We on Scientific Integrity?”, OSTP BLOG
(June 18, 2010, 8:21 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/18/ask-dr-h-where-arewe-scientific-integrity.
81. White House Office of Sci. and Tech., Talking Points, 2010 doc set at
PEERvOSTP000146-47,
available
at
http://www.peer.org/docs/doc/12_22_10_—
2010_OSTP_docs.pdf (document dated July 9, 2010, reporting agreement between OSTP
and OMB “on penultimate language”); id. at PEERvOSTP000151, 156 (documents dated
July 19, 2010, referencing upcoming meeting between Holdren and OMB Director Peter
Orszag); White House Office of Sci. and Tech., Talking Points, 2009 doc set at
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yet regarding the substance of OMB’s concerns, it seems intuitive that
OMB would have been concerned over the prospect of losing some of its
longstanding power to clear agencies’ scientific testimony and certain
Indeed, the December 2010
scientific reports for dissemination.82
recommendations do “not challenge the long-standing practice of OMB
review of testimony, nor [do they] question OMB’s role in reviewing
agency scientific findings, regulations, and information collections—
activities that allow OMB to inject political considerations into scientific
and technical matters.” 83 What is more, the recommendations state that
they are not intended to affect the OMB when the latter performs functions
“relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.”84
Second, while the December recommendations have some merit, as
discussed in Part III, for the most part they are short and relatively vague
statements of principle on which individual agencies are to base their own,
presumably more detailed guidelines.85 This fact, too, lends credence to the
theory that the four page document was delayed due not to wrangling over
nuances of language or other fine points, but to reluctance by political
appointees to relinquish control over information. Indeed, the fact that the

PEERvOSTP000065,
67,
available
at
http://www.peer.org/docs/doc/
12_22_10_2009_OSTP_docs.pdf (document dated June 29, 2009, stating that “OSTP staff
are working closely with OMB to revise the proposed recommendations to the President”);
id. at PEERvOSTP000018-20 (document dated June 29, 2009, explaining that “OSTP and
OMB continue to negotiate a handful of remaining fine points”); id. at PEERvOSTP000031
(document dated July 10, 2009, stating “Latest draft of Holdren response to the
memorandum was sent to OMB for review on July 9th”). See also News Release, PEER,
Science Transparency Policy Swathed in Secrecy (Dec. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1438 (describing thin document disclosure
from OSTP and apparent hold-ups in discussions between OSTP and OMB); Dan Froomkin,
New Obama Scientific Integrity Memo is Late and Vague, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/17/new-obama-scientific-inte_n_798483.html
(updating a posting first dated December 17, 2010, Froomkin writes of the disclosed
documents, “[t]he vast majority of the 155 pages were blacked out, but they indicated that
the guidance had been derailed by the [OMB]”).
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (referencing that power and some of its
sources).
83. Press Release, OMB Watch, OMB Watch Sees White House Science Memo as a
Step Forward, (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11423; see also
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity from John P. Holdren for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Dec. 17, 2010), at pt. V [hereinafter John Holdren Scientific
Integrity Memo] available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf .
84. John Holdren Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 83, at pt. V(ii).
85. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, White House Issues Long-Delayed Science Guidelines,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at A13 (quoting environmental studies Professor Roger A.
Pielke, Jr. to the effect that “‘[t]he guidelines are substantively quite thin’” and that because
they are merely “‘a starting line for agencies to consider these issues, what is surprising is
how long it took to get [them] out’”); News Release, Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility, New Obama Scientific Integrity Guidance: Timid, Torn, and Tardy (Dec.
20, 2010), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1437 (calling
document “vague and contradictory” and quoting PEER executive director Jeff Ruch as
saying, “‘[t]his guidance was almost two years in the making but it reads like it was finalized
at the last minute’”).
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memorandum leaves “enormous discretion” to all affected agencies86
suggests that the OMB was not alone in fearing loss of information control.
PEER offers some examples of the discretion with which OSTP leaves
agencies. It observes:
Despite its lengthy gestation, the memo sidesteps several critical topics,
including:
Whether alterations of scientific and technical papers and the reasons for
those changes will be part of a public record or whether these rewrites
will remain secret;
Whether non-scientist senior managers may alter scientific documents for
non-technical reasons. The memo only forbids alterations by “political
officials” and “public affairs officers.” Thus, for example, alterations of
Arctic offshore drilling reviews by non-scientist managers as documented
in an April 2010 Government Accountability Office report may not be
prohibited; and
The memo once mentions adoption of “appropriate whistleblower
protections” but does not say what is “appropriate” or even what
specialists will be allowed to blow the whistle. It concludes by stipulating
that nothing in the memo created any “substantive or procedural” right
against a federal agency or officer, suggesting any new protections may
only be rhetorical.87

Finally, as of January 2011, the administration has hardly been
forthcoming about the reasoning and dialogue behind the recommendations
or their delay. PEER filed a FOIA request with OSTP on August 11, 2010,
seeking “all comments, communications and recommendations developed
between OSTP and executive departments and agencies, related to the
proposed policies and any explanations of OSTP’s delay in publishing these
policies in accordance with the President’s timeline.” 88 On October 19,
2010, PEER filed suit under FOIA in federal district court for the same
information. 89 On December 22, 2010, OSTP disclosed 155 pages of
documents, most of which are blacked out.90 According to PEER, “all of
the meeting notes, progress reports and even congressional testimony were
86. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity Directive
“Articulates a Broad Vision for Defending Science from Political Interference,” (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/scientific-integrity-directive0484.html (quoting UCS’ Dr. Francesco Grifo as deeming the recommendations a
“‘promising blueprint’” but noting that “‘[a]t the same time, I’m worried that the directive
leaves an enormous amount of discretion to the agencies’”); see also, e.g., Froomkin, supra
note 81 (noting concerns of scientists and advocates over discretion left to agencies).
87. Press Release, PEER, supra note 85.
88. Complaint, supra note 79 at 1–2. see also id. at 5.
89. Id at 1–3, 5–6, 16–23; see also Press Release, PEER, Lawsuit to Expose Cause of
Scientific
Integrity
Rules
Holdup,
(Oct.
19,
2010),
available
at
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1414.
90. See supra note 81 (citing to PEER and Dan Froomkin’s descriptions of the disclosed
documents and to some of the documents themselves).

2410

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

heavily redacted.” 91 PEER wrote on December 22, 2010 that it continued
to seek information, including: “What were the thorny issues that dragged
out and diluted the OSTP process; Which agencies voiced what specific
objections and concerns; and How did OMB affect the drafting of guidance
and what role will it continue to play”? 92
B. Administration Practices and Legal Claims
Perhaps more telling than the saga of the scientific integrity guidelines
are the practices in which the administration has engaged and the legal
claims that it has made over the past two years. Examples demonstrate that
the Obama Administration, like past administrations, is not immune to the
pull to control scientific information, or to leave open avenues and legal
justifications for so doing. To be clear, these examples are not
comprehensive, and they are not meant to paint a complete picture of the
Obama Administration’s relationship to scientific integrity. They are meant
simply to illustrate that presidential administration can undermine scientific
integrity and some key means by which it can do so. Additionally, they
demonstrate that threats to scientific integrity—while varying in
manifestation and degree—cut across administrations and parties. Such
continuities call to mind James Madison’s admonition that humans are
neither angels nor governed by angels.93 Or, more to the point, as Dr.
Francesca Grifo of the Union of Concerned Scientists cautioned shortly
after President Obama’s inauguration, in the face of high expectations from
scientists around the country: “Just because we have well-meaning smart
people in there now doesn’t mean [that events like those in the Bush
Administration] can’t happen again.” 94
With respect to its legal arguments, the Obama Administration has
echoed previous administrations in taking the view that the President has an
exclusive constitutional prerogative to control communications between
executive branch employees and Congress. In a signing statement,
President Obama flagged the narrow construction that he would accord a
statutory provision that “prohibit[s] the use of appropriations to pay the
salary of any Federal officer or employee who interferes with or prohibits
certain communications between Federal employees and Members of
Congress.” 95 The President indicated that he would “not interpret this
provision to detract from [his] authority to direct the heads of executive
departments to supervise, control, and correct employees’ communications
with the Congress in cases where such communications would be unlawful
or would reveal information that is properly privileged or otherwise

91. Press Release, PEER, supra note 81.
92. Id.
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 239 (James Madison) (Hallowell et al. eds., 1857).
94. Gardiner Harris & William J. Broad, Scientists Welcome Administration’s Words but
Must Wait for Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A23.
95. Presidential Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act (Mar. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900145/pdf/DCPD-200900145.pdf.
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confidential.” 96 As it relates to scientific integrity, this view would protect
the President’s ability to continue to direct the OMB in its longstanding role
vetting agency testimony, including that of a scientific nature. This position
similarly would protect the President’s ability to have the vetting function
performed by individual agency heads.
In practice, the Obama Administration has indeed followed the lead of
past administrations in requiring testimony and certain other reports to be
cleared by OMB. 97 In one recent, high profile case involving the BP oil
spill, OMB’s vetting process might have compromised scientific integrity.
In an October 2010 working paper on the spill, the staff of the National
Commission investigating the incident (the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling) addressed the
government’s early estimates of the oil flow rate, which were later found to
have been inaccurately low. 98 The Commission staff was informed that,
shortly after the spill, “NOAA [the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration] wanted to make public some of its long-term, worst-case
discharge models for the . . . spill,” but OMB denied its request to do so.99
The White House, OMB, and NOAA have denied any improper
interference by OMB. 100 Furthermore, the final Commission Report,
released on January 11, 2011, neither repeats nor retracts the claim about
OMB interference. The final report simply does not mention it. The final
report does elaborate on the unrealistically low nature of the government’s
original public estimates. The report recounts a statement at a press
conference by Admiral Mary Landry on April 28 that “‘NOAA experts
believe that the output could be as much as 5000 barrels [per day].’”101
The report notes that “5,000 barrels per day was a back-of-the-envelope
estimate,” but that it “remained the official government estimate of the spill
size” for the next four weeks. 102 By the time that the final report was
issued, the government’s estimate had climbed to “about 60,000 barrels per
day.” 103
Regardless of what transpired at OMB in late April regarding flow-rate
estimates, the controversy reminds us of the risk that scientific estimates or
other analysis can become compromised in the process of political preclearance. Furthermore, the lack of clarity as to what happened between
96. Id.
97. See supra note 72 (citing to current clearance directives).
98. The Amount and Fate of the Oil 1–8, 14–16 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Working Paper No. 3, 2010).
99. Id. at 10.
100. See, e.g., Ben Gemen, OMB Denies Report It May Have Suppressed Data During
BP Spill, E2 WIRE, THE HILL’S ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL BLOG (Oct. 6, 2010, 3:46 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/123041-white-house-denies-it-suppressed-oilflow-data.
101. FINAL COMM’N REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE
OIL
DRILLING
135
(2010),
available
at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdf_final/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 146; see also id. at 167 (breaking down the numbers a bit further).
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OMB and NOAA reflects the broader difficulty of determining who did
what and when in interactions between the OMB and other agencies.104
Political clearance requirements and constitutional arguments defending
them also have serious implications for the protection of scientific and other
whistleblowers. These implications are illuminated by the testimony of
Rajesh De, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Policy, speaking on behalf of the Obama Administration
regarding proposed new whistleblower protections. While expressing
strong general support for protecting whistleblowers, De objected to
provisions that would enable whistleblowers to share classified or
privileged information with Congress without executive branch approval.
Such provisions, De said, “would unconstitutionally restrict the ability of
the President to protect from disclosure information that would harm
national security” or undermine executive privilege. 105 De also expressed
concern over provisions that would enable federal juries to order the
reinstatement of individuals who had lost their government jobs after their
security clearances were stripped for retaliatory reasons. “Providing a
judicial remedy” in such cases, said De, “even one that does not mandate
restoration of the [security] clearance, is inconsistent with the traditional
deference afforded Executive Branch decision-making in this area.” 106
104. Another post-oil spill incident also reflects the risks to scientific accuracy when
statements get filtered through White House offices. On August 4, 2010, Carol Browner,
director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy (OECCP), told
major news outlets that “‘the vast majority’ . . . of the oil ‘is gone’ or ‘appears to be gone.’”
Id. Previously, however, NOAA had privately expressed disagreement with this assessment
in an e-mail to Browner’s deputy. Id. at 168. Later on August 4th, Browner, speaking at a
press briefing, said that the report that she had cited on the oil’s fate had been “subjected to a
scientific protocol, which means you peer review, peer review, and peer review.” Id. at 168.
Earlier in the same briefing, NOAA’s administrator had also deemed the report peer
reviewed. Id. Outside scientists quickly criticized the report as premature, “especially
because of the uncertain rate of [the oil’s] biodegradation.” Id. It also soon came to light,
and NOAA acknowledged, that the report had not yet been peer reviewed at the time of
Browner’s announcements. Indeed, a final, peer reviewed report was not available until
November 23, 2010. Id. at 168–69. Browner’s mistake, of course, was remedied quickly
through the responses of outside scientists. Yet in less high profile cases, White House
mistakes in presenting scientific information may not be caught nearly so readily.
Furthermore, Browner’s error highlights the political motivations that can push White House
officials to place the most positive (or otherwise politically desirable) public spin on a
scientific matter. Such error may be entirely unintentional. Regardless, such a mistake
highlights the importance of transparency so that external forces may catch errors, as
happened here, as well as internal procedures facilitating review and push-back by
government scientists. Indeed, at the same August 4 afternoon press briefing in which
Browner appeared, NOAA Director Jane Lubchenco, a marine scientist and environmental
ecologist, also appeared and expressed reservations about Browner’s optimistic numbers.
The Amount and Fate of the Oil, supra note 98, at 21. A system of rigid, top-down clearance
for press appearances might well have prevented Lubchenco’s statement.
105. The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1507
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, 111th Cong. 66 (2009) (statement of
Ragish De, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice); The
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, Hearing on S.372 Before the Oversight
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 41, (2009) (Statement of
Ragish De, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice).
106. Hearing on S. 372 at 39; Hearing on H.R. 1507 at 68.
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Additionally, whistleblower rights groups have expressed alarm over the
Obama Administration’s aggressive approach to whistleblower cases,
including those involving science agencies or scientific information. For
example, Justice Department lawyers have continued to defend the Bush
Administration’s firing of former U.S. Park Police Chief Teresa Chambers.
The U.S. Park Police is situated within the Interior Department and
Chambers is represented in her legal defense by PEER. 107 Chambers was
fired at least partly for conveying safety and budgetary concerns to the
Washington Post without authorization. 108 Justice Department lawyers
argued in their 2009 brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit that the Bush Administration properly charged Chambers for,
among other things, “disclos[ing] budget information in violation of a
directive of the [OMB]” and “disclos[ing] security information relating to
the deployment of Park Police.” 109
Science agency employees and scientific information are also impacted
by the Obama Administration’s unprecedented push to criminally prosecute
government employees who leak classified information. 110 Much classified
information, after all, involves scientific matters ranging from weapons
engineering to the efficacy of electronic surveillance methods to chemical
production hazards.
One prosecution initiated by the Obama
Administration, for example, targets computer software expert Thomas
Drake, who reportedly conveyed to his bosses at the National Security
Agency (NSA), the NSA Inspector General, the Defense Department’s
Inspector General, the congressional intelligence committees, and the
Baltimore Sun, his concerns that the NSA was investing large amounts of
money in inefficient and unwieldy intelligence management systems while
overlooking more effective and more privacy-protective programs. 111

107. See Press Release, PEER, Chambers Wins Appeal Over Removal as U.S. Park
Police
Chief
(Apr.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://www.peer.org/
news/news_id.php?row_id=1336.
108. Chambers v. Dep’t of Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
109. Brief of Respondent at 14–15, Chambers v. Dep’t. of Interior, 602 F.3d 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (No. 2009–3120), 2009 WL 3044489.
110. See Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and
Presidential Supremacy, 5 ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2011) (describing
the large uptick in prosecutions and criminal investigations for leaking classified information
in the Obama Administration); see also Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in
Disclosure Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A15 (describing new leak indictment
issued in early January 2011, and noting that the indictment “is the fifth case during the
Obama administration in which a current or former government official has been charged in
connection with a leak investigation”).
111. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Obama Steps up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at A1; Scott Shane, Former N.S.A. Official is Charged in Leaks
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at A18.
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III. SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION: HOW PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CAN HELP TO
FACILITATE INFORMATION INTEGRITY
Presidential administration and scientific integrity are not always
antithetical to each other. While the President and his advisers have
substantial capacity to act in secret and incentives to manipulate facts, they
also have unrivaled access to national and international stages and
incentives to appear forthcoming. The tools of presidential administration
thus can be used to bolster, as well as to compromise, information integrity.
The Obama Administration’s first half provides some evidence of
presidential administration’s potential to positively impact information
integrity, while also demonstrating its ability to do just the opposite.
Indeed, disappointment over the lethargy of the White House’s scientific
integrity efforts should not obscure the lessons to be gleaned from the very
fact that the scientific integrity initiative, and related pledges of
transparency and information integrity, formed so prominent a part of the
Obama campaign and the administration’s early days. Candidate Obama
repeatedly promised to run “the most transparent administration in
American history,” 112 and on his first full day in office issued an executive
order and two memoranda directed toward increasing government
transparency. 113 He and his advisers also emphasized their commitment to
scientific integrity throughout the presidential campaign and from the
earliest moments of the administration, including the inaugural address. 114
As a matter of politics, these aspects of the Obama candidacy and
administration reflect two larger phenomena. First, it is hard to go wrong,
politically, praising concepts like transparency and scientific integrity in the
abstract. While polling responses become more mixed as questions get
more specific—as Americans are asked, for example, whether national
security information should be protected—Americans express support for
transparency and related concepts in the abstract.115
Second, there are moments in history in which the political momentum to
strengthen protections for oft-cited values like the rule of law and
112. See Rood & Chuchmach, supra note 16.
113. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Brian Beary, Top Obama Official Reaffirms Commitment to Cap and
Trade, EUROPOLITIC ENV’T, Jan. 22, 2009; Katherine Boyle, EPA: Obama Vowed To
Increase Agency Funding, Protect Scientific Integrity, GREENWIRE, Nov. 7, 2008; Harris &
Broad, supra note 94, at A23; Alex Kaplun, Senate Confirms Energy, Interior, USDA
Secretaries, But Delays on EPA, CEQ Heads, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 21, 2009;
Science Debate 2008 at question no. 12 and corresponding answers, SCIENCEDEBATE,
http://www.sciencedebate.org/debate08.html.
115. See, e.g., 2009 Sunshine Week Survey About Public Attitudes Toward Government
Secrecy, http://www.opengovva.org/virginias-foia-resources/sunshine-week/1165?
task=view; State of the First Amendment 2008, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, at 5, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/SOFA2008survey.pdf; First Amendment Center
and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Government Secrecy Poll, Mar. 7, 2005, at
1–2; The Bush Administration’s Secrecy Policy: A Call to Action to Protect Democratic
Values, OMBWATCH Part III: Research: What the American Public Believes (Oct. 24,
2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/639.
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transparency are enhanced. In the wake of Watergate and other abuse-ofpower scandals, for example, landmark hearings were held and laws passed
by Congress, including amendments to strengthen FOIA that were passed
over President Ford’s veto. 116 Presidents are well-positioned to harness and
to benefit from such moments politically, particularly if they replace
administrations perceived as scandal-ridden or unduly opaque. 117
Candidate and then President Obama’s early words and deeds, and the
reaction to the same by scientists and transparency advocates, suggest an
initial sense among a subset of the President’s political base and perhaps on
the President’s part that such a moment had arrived for scientific integrity
and transparency. For example, a New York Times article referred to recent
“wounds to scientific integrity that President Obama promised to heal in his
Inaugural Address.” 118 The article added that “[t]he quickest-acting balm
was the change of tone, delivered instantly in the speech.”119 It also cited
government scientists who “reported being teary-eyed with joy” at the
change in administrations and what it could mean for scientific integrity.120
Relatedly, the group openthegovernment.org wrote that “[t]he elections of
2008 were viewed by many as a referendum on the secrecy and
unaccountability of the Bush Administration, and the country elected a
President who has promised the most open, transparent and accountable
federal Executive Branch in history.” 121
Furthermore, President Obama’s early words and pledges, including the
2009 scientific integrity memorandum, appear to have had some influence
within agencies. While the picture is not all bright—for example, some
agencies still require scientists to pre-clear even unofficial public
communications relevant to their work with public affairs officers122—
116. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 483, 496–97 (2010); Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of
Information Norms, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, Electronic Briefing Book No. 142 (Nov. 23,
2004), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm.
117. This notion calls to mind political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s concept of a
“reconstruction” president. Such a “president heralds from the opposition to the previously
established regime, and pre-established commitments of ideology and interest have, in the
course of events, become vulnerable to direct repudiation as failed or irrelevant responses to
the problems of the day.” STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 36 (1997).
Skowronek calls the “politics of reconstruction” the “most promising of all situations for the
exercise of political leadership” by presidents. Id. at 37. Of course, Skowronek also
observes that modern reconstruction presidents may have more trouble distinguishing
themselves from their predecessors than they did in the past, due to the thickening of the
institutional apparatus that surrounds the presidency. Id. at 55–57. Skowronek’s analysis
provides a helpful lens for considering both the reconstruction rhetoric of candidate and
President Obama regarding scientific integrity, as well as the uneven and at times counterproductive nature of his administration’s actions and claims with respect to scientific
integrity.
118. Harris & Broad, supra note 94, at A23.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Secrecy
Report
Card,
2010,
OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG,
http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SecrecyRC_2010.pdf, at 3.
122. See, e.g., Press Release, PEER, Lift Gag Order Muzzling NOAA Scientists, (July 12,
2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1372 (discussing Department of
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some headway has been made since President Obama took office. For
instance, scientific integrity groups lavished praise on Interior Secretary
Ken Salazar for a September 2010 order directing his department to create a
scientific integrity policy. The Union of Concerned Scientists, while
cautioning that a policy with clear rules and time-frames must soon follow,
approvingly describes the order as stating among other things that the
Interior Department will “protect whistleblowers who expose the misuse of
scientific information[] and clarify government scientists’ right to share
their research and scientific analyses with the public and the press.”123 The
Interior order presumably was meant in part as a response to the
Administration’s March 2009 memorandum. 124 Furthermore, the order was
responsive to recent criticisms, both internal and external, of the
Department. An earlier, considerably weaker draft was roundly panned by
scientific integrity groups.125 And an April 2010 Inspector General report
was highly critical of the Department for its approach to scientific integrity
and its lack of a policy. 126
Additionally, while aspects of the administration’s response to the BP oil
spill have rightly been criticized, it also must be noted that some of what we
now know about that response—including the possibility, noted in Part II,
that OMB prevented NOAA from releasing worst case scenario flow rate
estimates—we know due to the work of a commission created by President
Obama through executive order. 127 Of course, one should not be naïve in
assessing the truth-finding value of presidential commissions where
government wrongdoing may be at issue. Such commissions can, after all,
be handy means to stave off or deflect attention from more damaging
Commerce, Office of Management and Organization, Public Communications Policy, DAO
219-1,
effective
Apr.
30,
2008,
at
§§
6–7,
11,
http://www.osec.doc.gov/omo/dmp/daos/dao219_1.html); see also, e.g., Press Release,
PEER, Forest Cops Chafe Under Tight Media Muzzle (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1335 (describing similar directive within
US Forest Service); Press Release, PEER, Obama Gag Order on Federal Workers Like
Those Under Bush (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1298
(same).
123. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Science Group Praises New
Department of Interior Scientific Integrity Policy as a Great First Step; Calls for Department
to Furnish Details and Deadlines (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.ucsusa.org/
news/press_release/science-group-praises-new-0457.html; see also Secretary of Interior,
Order No. 3305, Ensuring Scientific Integrity Within the Department of the Interior (Sept.
29, 2010), http://elips.doi.gov/app_so/act_getfiles.cfm?order_number=3305 [hereinafter
Order No. 3305]; Press Release, PEER, Interior Makes Big Stride on Scientific Integrity
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1409.
124. See Order No. 3305, supra note 123, at § 2.
125. See, e.g., Press Release, PEER, Interior Posts Only Half of a Scientific Integrity
Policy (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1396.
126. See generally Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Evaluation
Report: Interior Lacks a Scientific Integrity Policy, Report No. WR-EV-MOA-0014-2009
(Apr.
2010),
available
at
http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/
ScientificIntegrityPolicy.pdf.
127. Press Release, White House, Weekly Address: President Obama Establishes
Bipartisan National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling (May 22, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-addresspresident-obama-establishes-bipartisan-national-commission-bp-deepwa.
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inquiries. 128 Yet the commission staff’s finding about the flow rate
estimate illustrates that there are limits on the extent to which political
actors can control investigative mechanisms once they are in place.
Political incentives can, in short, lead Presidents to announce inquiries or
otherwise to take pro-transparency actions that—despite presidential
intentions to keep such activities within tight confines—take on lives of
their own.
A. Reflections on the Past Two Years
The story of scientific integrity in the first two years of the Obama
Administration supports several propositions relating to constitutional law,
politics, and constitutional politics. I group those points into three bigpicture lessons on which I elaborate below. The first lesson is that
presidential administration is not an unequivocally good thing for
accountability, given its capacity to foster information control. Certainly,
presidential administration can conduce to accountability under certain
conditions, but whether and when it does so is a very fact-dependent matter.
Furthermore, some of the conditions that conduce to accountability may
violate perfect unity, even if they are consistent with aspects of presidential
administration. These points have negative implications for unitary
executive theory’s major functional justification, which is that unity
enhances accountability. Second, if Congress indeed has the constitutional
flexibility that I and others have argued it does to structure the bureaucracy
and to protect information integrity, the question that remains is how
Congress might use that leeway to foster scientific integrity in government.
The events and patterns of the past two years and beyond suggest that
Congress would be well advised to harness the positive potential of
presidential administration while supplementing and checking it through
statutory direction and constraint. For example, Congress might give the
President a wide berth within which to create open government initiatives,
while imposing protective statutory floors such as whistleblower rights to
report directly to Congress, prohibitions on non-scientists pre-clearing
scientific reports, and greater documentation regarding White House
involvement in decisionmaking. The third lesson begins with the
assessment that both the Obama Administration and Congress failed, over
the past two years, to take full advantage of the political backlash against
information control sparked during the Bush Administration. From there, I
128. See, e.g., KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT 49 (1996)
(describing President Ford’s appointment of a commission headed by Vice President
Rockefeller as a means to “preempt a congressional inquiry” into recent scandals). In an
amusing example of the Rockefeller Commission’s attempt to head off embarrassing
disclosures, a book recounts the following:
After [CIA Director] Colby’s second or third appearance before the commission
investigators, Rockefeller drew Colby aside and said, ‘Bill, do you really have to
present all this material to us? We realize there are secrets that you fellows need to
keep, and so nobody here is going to take it amiss if you feel there are some
questions you can’t answer quite as fully as you seem to feel you have to.’
ANGUS MACKENZIE, SECRETS: THE CIA’S WAR AT HOME 62 (1997).
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offer some thoughts on how political momentum toward information
integrity might be better seized, and even created, in the future.
B. Lesson #1: Accountability Is No Simple Thing (or Why Unity and
Accountability Do Not Always Mix, and the Constitutional Implications
Thereof)
As noted in Part II, I have elsewhere critiqued unitary executive theory.
To briefly summarize those critiques: constitutional text, structure, and
history do not demand a fully unitary executive. 129 Unity thus can only be
supported, if at all, on functionalist grounds. Unitarians rely on the relative
accountability of the unitary executive as their major functional
justification. 130 However, information integrity, including transparency, is
a necessary condition to achieving constitutional accountability values.131
Logic and history—including much recent history—demonstrate that unity
can and often does undermine information integrity. As such, it undermines
accountability by enabling executive branch personnel to hide or
manipulate facts that would help the public or the other branches to judge
their actions. 132 Furthermore,
one need not agree that unity plainly undermines accountability to share
[the] conclusion that the accountability argument for unity is flawed. . . .
So long as it is reasonably arguable that unity undermines, rather than
bolsters, accountability, then unity fails to so plainly further
accountability as to support an unyielding, categorical unity directive. 133

From all of this it follows not that Congress may fracture unity as much as
it likes, but rather that it has a fair amount of discretion to impose checks on
the President, including by fracturing unity, subject to case-by-case
balancing as to whether Congress has gone so far as to defeat accountability
in any given case. 134
The Obama Administration’s first two years provide additional support
for the notion that unity does not necessarily advance accountability and
that it can undermine it by compromising information integrity. We have
seen, for example, that even in the context of an information integrity
initiative spearheaded by the President personally and very publicly
managed through a White House office (the OSTP), it can be difficult if not
impossible to discover who did what and who knew what when. 135 We are
also reminded that presidential control over executive subordinates and
actions, either personally or through OMB or other offices, can translate
129. Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 618–34.
130. Id. at 613; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1746–47.
131. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1760.
132. Id. at 1768–69.
133. Id. at 1743–44.
134. Id. at 1755–56 (reaching this conclusion, and explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court
embraced essentially the same approach in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
135. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
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into information pre-clearance power. 136 Such power poses risks that
scientific information will be cloaked or manipulated for political ends, thus
compromising the ability of the public or the other branches to assess
agency actions. 137 Such power also threatens the ability of whistleblowers
to check the executive branch from within by exposing the manipulation of
science or other forms of corruption or incompetence. 138
In short, the events of the last two years do nothing to dispel the notion,
and provide further evidence, that the trappings of unity can undermine
information integrity and accountability. This fact remains true even if
unity can positively impact accountability under certain conditions, for
example, through White House demands that subordinates act with greater
transparency. Indeed, that unity in some cases can positively impact
accountability and in other cases can undermine it is perfectly consistent
with the notion that Congress must have discretion, within functional
bounds, to leave the conditions of unity intact or to disrupt them in any
given case. Such discretion enables Congress to consider whether unity
will help or hinder accountability under the circumstances addressed in
particular pieces of legislation.
C. Lesson #2: How Statutory Schemes Might Supplement and Constrain
Presidential Administration To Enhance Information Integrity
That presidential administration is a mixed bag for scientific integrity not
only is demonstrated by experience, but makes quite a bit of sense. On the
one hand, the President has a built-in structural capacity to act in secret, and
ample motivation to see the administrative state reach scientific conclusions
that are politically convenient. Furthermore, “[p]residential control is a
‘they,’ not an ‘it.’” 139 So long as presidential control effectively means
control by hundreds of political appointees,140 the potential for intentional
or incidental obfuscation as to who took or ordered given actions and why
is substantial. The potential for obfuscation is further bolstered by the use
and shadow effects of doctrines like executive privilege and state secrets
privilege. On the other hand, the President has unique access to national
136. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
139. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael B. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006).
140. As this discussion reflects, unitarians often treat the President and the White House
staff as interchangeable. On this view, power that belongs to the President as head of the
unitary executive branch may be exercised by White House officers to whom the President
delegates power. Yet the notion that the President may freely delegate his “unitary” power
has not gone unchallenged. In his contribution to this Symposium issue, Professor Saiger
argues that a unitarian reading of the Constitution does not encompass a presidential freedom
to “deputize agents on his staff to wield executive power on his behalf just as he could wield
it himself.” Aaron Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011). Similarly, Saikrishna Prakash has argued
that the Constitution is unitarian but that it does not license the President to “delegate his
own power to others.” Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s
Unitary Executive, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 716 (2009).
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and international bully pulpits and political incentives to associate himself
with transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. And neither
Congress nor the bureaucracy is immune to capture from financial or
ideological interests or to the pull of “bent science.”141 Presidential
leadership thus has the potential to serve as a real counter-force, both
rhetorically and through directives, against the pull of information control
within or outside of the executive branch.
Simply put, presidential administration has a potential to further
information integrity that should be harnessed, but it also has a capacity for
information control that calls for statutory checking. As an initial matter,
some statutory checks might face (and in some cases have faced) objections
on the grounds that they violate executive unity or the President’s
constitutional power to keep secrets. With respect to unity, above I
referenced other work in which I argue that the Constitution does not
impose a categorical unity directive. With respect to presidential claims of
a constitutional right to keep secrets, I have elsewhere detailed my view that
such claims are constitutionally unsound, and that Congress in fact has a
broad constitutional power to create statutes imposing disclosure
requirements on the President or otherwise checking executive secrecy.142
Once we move past the constitutional arguments, we are returned to the
realm of policy, and the question of what statutory measures are desirable,
assuming that Congress has the constitutional power to create them. While
a detailed set of proposals is beyond the scope of this Article, the remainder
of this section offers some guiding principles and examples.
A key starting point is the notion that external checks and internal checks
often depend on one another, a point on which scholars have increasingly
For example, it has been noted, quite properly, that
focused. 143
whistleblowers can serve as very important internal checks—or checks
from within the executive branch—by exposing incompetence or corruption
within agencies. 144 At the same time, externally imposed whistleblower
protections are necessary if whistleblowers are not to be at the mercy of the
very executive branch that they seek to criticize.145 Thus, whistleblower
rights to reveal information directly to congresspersons or to receive
meaningful remedies from juries—despite opposition to both from the
Obama Administration 146—are examples of important, externally imposed
and externally administered protections.
141. See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 14, at 34–38.
142. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 916–18.
143. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357, 362–64, 376–89; Seth F.
Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1011, 1016–21, 1033, 1045–46, 1056–59 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, The
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59
EMORY L.J. 423, 425–26, 439–52 (2009).
144. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 143, at 385–86.
145. Id. at 385–87.
146. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
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Another example of internal checks that can be fostered externally is the
existence of agency scientists who candidly share their analysis with the
public.
As we have seen, internal political interference—through
mechanisms such as OMB clearance or public affairs office clearance
within science agencies—can deeply hinder these checks. While the
Obama Administration has made some internal strides on this front, the
strides have been uneven and there is still a long way to go. Furthermore, if
protections are purely a function of internal policies, then they can be
altered at any point by the current administration or by future ones when
they prove inconvenient.
External protections are thus necessary
supplements to internal measures. Such protections might, for example,
forbid pre-clearance requirements for scientific testimony or media contact
by political offices.
A related internal check that Congress sometimes imposes via statute is
expertise. That is, Congress at times has required—despite administration
objections based on executive unity 147—minimum hiring qualifications for
appointees who exercise discretionary executive authority. Scientific
expertise as a hiring qualification has been emphasized by the Obama
Administration. 148 The Administration has made some high-profile hires to
demonstrate its commitment to the same—perhaps most notably, appointing
the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Chu to head the Department of
Energy. 149 Nonetheless, this is an area in which statutory requirements can
serve as external bulwarks, particularly for positions less high-profile than
Chu’s that get little public attention but deeply influence agencies and their
practices.
External checks not directly linked to internal ones also have important
roles to play. Transparency statutes such as FOIA and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act can help the public and the press discern whether extrascientific pressures were placed on agencies conducting scientific analyses.
Statutes outlining agency procedural requirements, particularly the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with its direct procedural mandates
and the record-keeping norms to which it has given rise, 150 also help
observers track the various inputs underlying agency decisions and
scientific justifications. Currently, however, there are significant gaps in
statutory coverage. The APA has been construed by the Supreme Court not
Furthermore, administrations have
to apply to the President. 151
suggested—sometimes as a matter of statutory interpretation, sometimes as
147. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 721–24 (2007) (citing signing statements
by President Clinton and President George W. Bush objecting to minimum qualification
requirements for Presidential appointees).
148. See Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 1.
149. See Dr. Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, DEP’T OF ENERGY,
http://www.energy.gov/organization/dr_steven_chu.htm.
150. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 881–900 (2007) (describing and criticizing some of the procedural
requirements that courts have inferred from the APA).
151. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 800–01 (1992).
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a matter of constitutional interpretation, and often as both—that statutory
openness and other procedural requirements do not apply to White House
offices. 152 The constitutional arguments must, of course, be addressed as
they arise. On the statutory front, such gaps that do exist should be closed.
Indeed, as some of the examples cited in this Article illustrate, it often is
particularly difficult to trace influences that emanate from the OMB or
other White House offices.
D. Lesson #3: Seizing Political Momentum Toward Information Integrity
As discussed in Part III, the start of the Obama Administration appeared
to be a historical moment in which the issue of information integrity had
real political resonance. With the new President and Congress both hailing
from the Democratic party and riding a backlash against the outgoing
Republican administration, the stage seemed set for information integrity
reforms to take hold, paralleling the wave of transparency measures and
other “good government” reforms that followed the scandals of Watergate.
The failure of developments thus far to live up to initial hopes can be
attributed partly to political and institutional changes of the past several
decades. For one thing, as political scientist Stephen Skowronek points out,
the thickening of institutions that surround the presidency—such as the
growth of the White House bureaucracy—makes it more difficult for
presidents to make sharp breaks from the practices of their predecessors,
even in “reconstruction” periods when new presidents take the reins from
widely repudiated Presidents of a different party. 153 Furthermore, certain
constitutional theories of presidential power, including executive privilege
and related theories of a broad presidential right to keep secrets, have grown
increasingly influential and ubiquitous. 154 Indeed, such arguments are
sometimes used as bases to avoid passing legislation in the first place.155
Additionally, the increasingly partisan nature of Congress makes it difficult
in periods of divided government for Presidents and Congress to get on the
same page politically to pass legislation.156 And in periods of unified
152. For example, the Obama White House (echoing a similar incident in the Bush
administration) claimed a constitutional right, as well a statutory exemption, to withhold
information from a group that invoked FOIA to request “records of visits by coal executives
in order to analyze whether these executives influenced the administration’s energy policy.”
While the administration ultimately relented and agreed to disclose the records, the incident
is a reminder of the practical significance of constitutional and statutory arguments as a
means for administrations to avoid disclosing information, and the continuity of such
arguments across administrations and parties. See Union of Concerned Scientists, White
House Visitor Logs and Lack of Transparency in the Obama Administration,
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/white-house-visitor-logsand.html.
153. See supra note 117.
154. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 110; Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the
Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06
(2010).
155. Kitrosser, supra note 110; Kitrosser, supra note 154, at 1430–33.
156. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316, 2332–34, 2339 (2006).
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government, it is difficult to build political momentum for legislation that
would meaningfully constrain the President.157
The question, from the perspective of information integrity advocates, is
how moments of political promise—like that which greeted the start of the
Obama Administration—might be seized to lock in both meaningful
internal changes and statutory protections. For one thing, advocates must
engage constitutional debates over presidential power in all three branches
of government and in the realm of public discourse. Beyond the
constitutional questions, advocates should pay careful attention to
calibrating the specificity of proposed statutory protections. As noted in
Part III, opinion polls reflect that while Americans support information
integrity in the abstract, they grow more equivocal as questions become
more specific. 158 Legislation thus must be identified broadly with values of
scientific integrity or transparency, while being specific enough to provide
meaningful, enforceable rules. In periods of unified government, advocates
might pitch such legislation in a manner both cooperative and
challenging—urging Congress and the President to put force behind their
words by encoding their shared ideals in statute. In periods of divided
government, the pitch might be more partisan in nature—appealing to
Congress’ desire to constrain an opposite-party President, while appealing
to the President’s desire to cultivate an image as one who will cross the
aisle to support values of transparency and the rule of law.
Presidential administration and congressional initiative can also play off
of each other dynamically. In a period of divided government, this might
amount to inter-branch one-upmanship. For example, congresspersons
might call the President on transparency promises, urging him to sign
legislation that constrains him in the interest of furthering his own pledges.
In a period of unified government, Congress might wait and see as
administrative experimentation takes place—for instance, as agencies draw
up scientific integrity plans in response to a broad presidential directive—
and then step in to legislatively codify or supplement some of the more
appealing plans.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution leaves Congress much discretion to pass statutes—
contingent, of course, on presidential approval or two-thirds support in each
chamber—that protect scientific integrity in government. One of the most
ubiquitous constitutional arguments against such protections is that they
violate the President’s power to control administration through a unitary
executive branch. Unity is demanded, say unitarians, by constitutional
accountability values. As we have seen, events in past administrations and
now in the Obama Administration demonstrate that unity does not always
conduce to accountability. In this, experiences of the past two years echo

157. Id. at 2344.
158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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earlier events that undermine the accountability-based argument for a
unitary executive.
At the same time, one ought not to write off as meaningless the several
high-profile transparency and scientific integrity pledges of the Obama
campaign and administration or the excitement that such pledges generated
among segments of the President’s political base. These phenomena offer
lessons in their own right. They suggest that transparency and scientific
integrity have some political resonance, that Presidents and presidential
candidates are aware of this fact, and that the presidential bully pulpit and
the tools of presidential administration can be harnessed to promote and
foster these values.
For advocates of transparency and scientific integrity, the two-fold trick
is in figuring out how to sustain political momentum toward such values
and how to harness the advantages of presidential administration without
facilitating White House information control. As this Article’s tentative
reflections on both points suggest, a partial response to both questions is for
advocates to place sustained political pressure on Congress and on the
President to create external and internal protections alike. Nor is politics
detached from the constitutional arguments referenced throughout this
Article—that is, unitary executive theory, theories favoring presidential
secrecy privileges, and arguments against both theories. Such arguments
play important roles in executive and congressional debates over whether to
pass, and how to administer, legislation. Furthermore, the modern
influence of presidentialist theories is due in no small part to concerted
Like
movements within and outside of the executive branch.159
presidentialists, then, transparency and scientific integrity advocates must
continue to engage the political branches as well as the judiciary. They
must do so not only to champion the policy advantages of internal and
external checking mechanisms, but to articulate the fallacies of the
presidentialist constitutional theories that would block much external
checking.

159. See, e.g., Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential
Power: A Developmental Perspective of the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070,
2073–77, 2092–2100 (2009); Julian E. Zelizer, The Conservative Embrace of Presidential
Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 499, 499–503 (2008).

